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of risk management
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ABSTRACT: The risk management systems in the Norwegian aviation sector in the aftermath of 9/11 
have been a top down process characterised by rapidity and secrecy and there has been little local and 
national risk assessment involved during the process. Both the aviation sector and the petroleum sector 
are technologically based organisational systems and both aspire to be associated with best practises of 
high reliability. A well known statement is that safety regulations in the petroleum sector are founded 
on traditional democratic ideals in working life. An important aspect of the Nordic regulation practise 
of safety has been to take care of the interests of groups and thereby increase personal responsibility 
concerning the workplace and security. The idea is that involvement and participation increase mission 
valences, legitimacy and trust and therefore the quality of the regulating regime as such. The paper will 
highlight differences and similarities between the two systems and discuss whether local participation and 
stakeholder involvement are necessary prerequisites for successful safety/security management.
regulation 2320/2002 which evolved into a detailed, 
deterministic system aimed at securing civil avia-
tion through a detailed and uniform system for all 
of the European countries. From the more goal-
based way of regulating, the new security regime 
essentially followed a ‘prescriptive’ regulatory 
approach which is based upon mandated compli-
ance (Penny, et al., 2001).
This paper discusse show the security regime 
in aviation deviates from traditional “Nordic” 
practises of technological risk management in the 
petroleum sector. The paper highlights differences 
and similarities between the two systems and ques-
tion whether local participation and stakeholder 
involvements are necessary prerequisites for suc-
cessful safety/security management.
1.1 Safety vs. security
In Norway it is only one common word that covers 
“safety” and “security”, namely “sikkerhet” (in ger-
man: sicherheit) whereas in English the two terms 
refer to different types of actions and contexts. In 
order to conceptually distinguish between the terms 
“safety” and “security”, Cambacedes & Chaudet 
(2010) have developed a fruitful framework that 
may serve the purposes of this article. The frame-
work starts with distinguishing between “system” 
vs. “environment” and “malicious” vs. “accident”. 
The system vs. environment (S-E) distinction refers 
to where “security is concerned with the risks 
originating from the environment and potentially 
1 INTROduCTION
Both the aviation sector and the petroleum sector 
are technologically based organisational systems 
and both aspire to be associated with best practises 
of high reliability. Traditionally the safety regime 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf  has been 
developed and governed by a sophisticated body 
of laws and regulations coined as the “ Nordic 
model” of Occupational Health and Safety and 
based on a three-part pillar with the regulator, the 
employer and the employees/unions as legitimate 
partners (Karlsen & Lindøe, 2006). It is reasonable 
to claim that the Nordic Model and the safety sys-
tem that has developed in the Norwegian oil indus-
try is closely connected. One important result of 
the Nordic Model was the working environmental 
act which established that technology has to adjust 
to human behavior and not the other way around. 
The traditional Norwegian safety system is thus 
found in the system-oriented approach where 
socio-technical design and organizational factors 
adjusted to how humans act are seen as the domi-
nant factors (Leveson, 2004; Reason, 1997).
The terrorist attacks that took place September 
9/11, 2001, demonstrated that the security system, 
comprising legislation, regulation, and implemen-
tation were not adequate to handle an intentional 
event of this magnitude.The 9/11 attacks caused 
a major reshuffling in the regulatory system and 
made it mandatory for all member countries. The 
convention formed the basis for Eu’s new frame 
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impacting the system whereas safety deals with 
the risk arising from the system and potentially 
impacting the environment”. The malicious vs. 
accidental (M-A) distinction refers to where “secu-
rity typically addresses malicious risks while safety 
addresses purely accidental risks” (Cambacedes & 
Chaudet 2010 pp. 59). From this point of depar-
ture Cambacedes & Chaudet develop the following 
matrix in order to place different issues related to 
safety and security.
In Table 1 the notion “defense” refers to mali-
cious actions and environment to system relations 
and will thus naturally be connected to intentional 
actions such as terrorist attacks. “Robustness” is 
connected to accidental events and will be associ-
ated with threats towards physical infrastructure 
such as natural disasters, floods and earthquakes. 
When it comes to notions such as “Safeguard” 
and “Containment ability” they refer to systems 
that may have unauthorized and disloyal person-
nel and to whether such systems possess capabili-
ties that sufficiently protect the environment from 
pollution, emissions etc. “Self-protection” refers to 
internal procedures in order to protect the organi-
zations from sabotage, criminal acts from the 
inside, and finally “Reliability” refers to organiza-
tional standards and procedures developed to make 
production and production staff as safe as possible. 
 Standardized safety procedures such as HRO prin-
ciples, self-regulation and internal control will nat-
urally be connected to this category. According to 
Table 1 we may therefore conclude that typical secu-
rity activities are related to “defense”, “safeguard” 
and “self-protection” and typical safety activities 
are related to “robustness”, “containment abilities” 
and “reliability”. However and as underlined by 
Cambacedes & Chaudet (2010), these sub- notions 
are less ambiguous then the terms “security” and 
“safety” but “cover their conceptual domains” 
(Cambacedes & Chaudet 2010 pp 60).
different connotations connected to safety and 
security will affect risk analysis and risk manage-
ment in industrial systems. As mentioned above, 
security risks are focused on intentional and mali-
cious actions where the goal is to alter political 
decisions (Bjørgo 2011). The complex motivations, 
intentionality and secrecy behind malicious actions 
constitute a genuine uncertainty that challenges and 
complicates the risk assessment and risk manage-
ment strategies. despite the fact that the terrorist 
threat in Norway (and in general) is low and char-
acterized by high uncertainty, the security agencies 
in Norway operate with a probabilistic approach 
towards possible attacks. According to instruction 
books developed by Norwegian Police Security 
Service (PST) and Norwegian National Security 
Authority (NSM) the risk assessment calculations 
take into consideration the terrorist intentions, 
capacity and how they evaluate relevant targets and 
develop scenarios with certain probabilities. These 
risk assessments lead further to conclusions that 
security regulations have to be based on a strategic 
risk management with focus on intelligence service 
and worst-case scenarios.1 The latter implies pre-
scriptive regulations with extensive use of precau-
tionary principles and detailed control systems not 
very different from those we have experienced in 
international aviation the last ten years.
1.2 Safety and security regulations in the aviation 
and petroleum industry
Before 9/11 the regulatory framework applied for 
civil aviation in general followed a more goal-based 
approach. In Norway, the ‘Civil Aviation Act’ 
(the national legislation for civil aviation) regu-
lated security. The recommendations from ICAO 
went through hearings where relevant actors had 
the possibility to participate and influence in the 
development of the actual national regulation. 
This process was normatively set to take three 
months. This was to assure a minimum standard of 
openness and transparency in the development of 
regulations (Nikolaisen, 2008). The goal was thus 
to achieve an acceptable level of security. ICAO’s 
recommendations were used as guidance and the 
development and implementation of it was left to 
national institutions and agencies.
After 9/11 and the implementation of Eu’s 
2320/2002 regulation, the regulatory system 
changed significantly. From ICAO’s recommen-
dations, the system evolved into a detailed regula-
tory framework that was to assure that all member 
countries would have a corresponding security 
system. In Norway, it took form through what has 
been labelled the ‘reference technique’ where new 
regulations from the Eu became attached to the 
existing Civil Aviation Act (Sejersted, Arnesen, 
Rognstad, Foyn, & Kolstad, 2004). Four open 
Eu regulations are attached to the Norwegian 
 Regulation on the Prevention of unlawful Acts 
Table 1. SEMA referential framework (Cambacedes & 
Chaudet 2010).
Environment  
to system
System to  
environment
System to 
system
Malicious defense Safeguard Self-
protection
Accidental Robustness Containment  
ability
Reliability
1http://www.pst.politiet.no/&  http://www.nsm.stat.no/.
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against the Security of Civil Aviation. However, 
twelve other Eu  regulations, applied through the 
same technique, are classified information and not 
available for others than authorities, enterprises, 
companies and persons that have special authori-
sation to handle this information. The details 
for how the regulations should be implemented 
are thoroughly described in Annex 17, which is 
withdrawn from public openness. Through these 
changes, it is evident that the regulatory practice 
for civil aviation security has had a large shift in 
structure and approach.
In the 1960’s and 1970’s a lot of changes took 
place concerning the regulatory regimes of the 
Norwegian workplace environment (Gustavsen & 
Hunnius, 1981; Ryggvik, 2007). The main objec-
tive of this re-organisation was a shift from a 
reactive to a proactive ideology, which underlined 
preventive action where participation and involve-
ment from the employees were important elements. 
The working environment acts in the Nordic coun-
tries were characterised by specified regulations 
of active participation through formal bodies that 
were given decision-making authorities and the 
establishment of safety deputies. An important 
reason for such a regulation of safety aspects are 
to take care of the interests of groups that are con-
fronted with asymmetrical power relations e.g the 
individual workers.
According to the “Nordic model”, collective 
agreements and rights are the basis of how work, 
including safety, are organised. To a high degree 
this is the case when it comes to the Norwegian 
petroleum industry. The laws and established prac-
tise in the petroleum industry underline collective 
agreements and active participation in accordance 
with the Norwegian Working Environmental Act 
of 1977. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the 
general ideas of the Working environmental act 
are based on what we earlier have denoted as the 
“socio-technical model” of organizations. Several 
important paragraphs of the Act underline that 
it is the organizational design that shall adapt to 
the workforce. This was indeed ideologically moti-
vated and was a result of the increased strength 
of the unions during the seventies (Bjørnhaug 
et al., 2000).
From a European point of view the Nordic 
countries when it comes to economic policy, work-
ing life and social welfare, has been character-
ized by similarities more than differences. There 
are many comparative studies between the Nor-
dic Countries and between the Nordic countries 
and other European countries that confirm this 
( Kettunen, 1998). The Nordic tradition was based 
on three pillars—or as mentioned above, “a trinity 
of collaboration”—involving employer, employees 
and the government. Although it was based on 
centralized agreements about uniform standards 
of employment conditions, it was open for local 
adjustments and actions. Job security and optimal 
working environment was the cornerstone of the 
model. A common feature within the Nordic OHS 
regime is the in-house use of an «Occupational 
Health and Safety Organisation» that offers three 
different collaborating structures. First, Safety 
Committees provide opportunities for employer 
and employees to meet and discuss important 
issues. Second, there are independent and autono-
mous «institutions» as Safety Representatives and 
third, there are a number of experts on occupa-
tional health and safety, who may be called upon 
in disputes, either as an in-house service or external 
consulting expertise.
In Figure 1 the triangle at the top illustrates the 
three pillar-model as a framework for the working 
life; the government, employer and employees. The 
triangle at the bottom links together the employer, 
employee and the safety deputy as representative 
of a collective work force (unions).
These institutions have long historical roots and 
have been developed through conflicts and nego-
tiations between the government, employers and 
employees’ organizations for over 100 years. The 
“Nordic model” is thus a working market model 
consisting of institutional frames organising and 
regulating negotiations, policy of wealth distri-
bution and conflict solutions. Working conflicts 
and clashes of interests between the parties are 
being solved through extensive laws and systems 
of agreements. Historically speaking, the Nordic 
Model implied that the employers to a certain 
extent supported the unions and their professional 
activities. Moreover, the employers have several 
times been forced to deemphasise their short term 
Collective 
aggreements on the
labourmarked 
ingeneral
Local collective 
agreemements
Government
Safety 
deputy
Employer Employee
Working life
The workplace
Figure 1. Three pillar-agreements of the Nordic model 
(Lindøe & Engen 2009).
1779
profit goal in advance of more long term manage-
rial objectives. The success of this policy may be 
explained by the strength of the unions, the strong 
 integration of the unions as negotiators and finally, 
the national and local deliberal political processes.
The Nordic model has opened up for socio-
 technical approaches when concerned with risk 
and risk management in uncertain and complex 
 situations. The principles of MTO and HRO have 
been gradually introduced in response to severe 
incidents and accidents (most significantly after the 
Alexander Kielland disaster)—which when hap-
pened—shocked prevailing institutional and organ-
isational regulatory practices of the oil  industry. 
Risk management has been developed in the inter-
section between the political system and the relevant 
operating organisations. To large extent governance 
structures have influenced organisational strate-
gies, management decisions, safety culture and 
risk management. Transparency, participation and 
deliberative democracy are underlying ideological 
principles in the Nordic Model and the “model” 
offers clear recommendations on how safety ought 
to be governed, managed and organised.
The Norwegian petroleum sector has never 
been exposed to intentional attacks or sabotage 
that has escalated into a disaster. Also on a global 
level research shows that terrorist attacks seldom 
hit the petroleum industry. The risk governance 
and risk management strategies have thus been 
almost unambiguously organized in order to built 
up a sophisticated and efficient safety regime. The 
development of a well functioning security regula-
tion framework has according to security respon-
sible personnel within the oil companies been 
de-emphasised in advantage of the safety regime. 
despite some initiatives from Norwegian Oil 
Industries Association (OLF) the security frame-
work within the companies is premature and lacks 
sufficient competence and resources.2 Recent stud-
ies on security regulations in the Norwegian Petro-
leum industry report of lack of experience with 
security related events and how the safety regime 
historically has occupied most of the resources 
(Stornes 2011).
The fact that safety dominates the petroleum 
sector worries those who work with security related 
issues onshore and offshore. According to Stornes 
(2011) the security regime in Statoil is too much 
goal based and thus similar to the routines and 
procedures of the safety system. According to the 
study made by Stornes (2011) there is a need for 
strengthening the risk analysis procedures related 
to security and to improve procedures of the secu-
rity regime. The latter also implies developing the 
expertise of governmental agencies on industrial 
security and implementation of a detailed and pre-
scriptive regulatory framework. Advocates of the 
security regime in Statoil want to free themselves 
from the safety regime and develop their own 
managerial procedures on how to regulate risk. 
In general this means to move from a goal based to 
a prescriptive regime—with extensive control.
1.3 Aviation security vs. petroleum safety
The security regime in aviation post 9/11 has been 
characterized through concepts such as secrecy, 
rapidity, and reactivity. The fact, as mentioned 
above, that twelve of 16 regulations are clas-
sified demonstrates the dimension of secrecy. 
Reports from the Ministry of Transportation have 
explained that few of the changes in security regu-
lation go through hearings. Because the regulatory 
system has been moved from the national level 
(pre 9/11) to the supra-national level (post 9/11), 
there is in effect very little preparation that actually 
take place in Norway. In the developing of secu-
rity regulation, work groups consisting of various 
agents are compiled in Brussels where the complete 
regulation will be prepared, worked through, and 
implemented after voting. The regulation then 
arrives through the Ministry of Transportation 
to the Civil Aviation Authority. This will then be 
translated and distributed to the airports with an 
expiry date for implementation. Some of the infor-
mation arriving from the Eu is so secret that only 
a handful of people have the clearance to see it.
The “Nordic model” of safety regulation has 
a system approach where the main objective is to 
minimise “unsafe acts” and to reduce risk expos-
ing for the individuals. To prevent “unsafe acts” 
and accidents thus implies to change the techni-
cal and organisational conditions prior of human 
behaviour. The robustness of the model requires 
or predicts a certain acknowledgment of the val-
ues behind, both regarding the regulatory regime 
and safety management system where collective 
rights are vital elements. In fact, top down pre-
scriptive regulative system enforce disintegration 
and undermine the basic principles behind safety 
principles in the Nordic model. In Norway as well 
as in other European countries there has been a 
decline in inter-collaboration during the 1990s 
which caused a gradual fragmentation of the col-
lective rights. Quite contrary to earlier periods, 
the 1990s has been a decade with strong influence 
from individual interests and rights promoting 
intrinsic principles and global “tools” of safety 
and security management systems rather than 
adapting national standards on safety regulation. 
This challenges the collective rights embedded in 
the Nordic OHS model of Occupational Health 2OLF Guideline 104.
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and Safety and safety management systems based 
on integrating social, technical and organisational 
issues (MTO).
Table 2 sums up our discussion so far.
The safety regimes in aviation and the Norwe-
gian petroleum industry have been constituted 
by a goal based regulatory system accompanied 
by participatory processes where the unions have 
played a leading and dominating role. In the safety 
regimes within the petroleum sector there have 
however been attempts to undermine the system 
by introducing more prescriptive procedures and 
detailed control with workers behaviour (Lindøe & 
Engen 2008). The security system that has devel-
oped in aviation is typically prescriptive by nature, 
and also elitist by the fact that very few participate 
in the decision making processes and where there is 
secrecy about the motives and reasons of the regu-
lations. Such regulatory traits are found both in the 
petroleum industry and in aviation. Even though 
the relative importance of security is far less in the 
petroleum sector than in aviation, it seems that the 
security agents in petroleum prefer a movement 
towards a more prescriptive and elitist system. In 
aviation on the other hand, the revealed prefer-
ences are to reduce the prescriptive character and 
open up for a more goal based and flexible system 
(Olsvik 2010). It is however important to underline 
that the safety and security regimes in both sectors 
are under constant revisions and our analysis only 
intends to describe movements on a general level.
2 dISCuSSION: RISK GOVERNANCE, 
SAFETY ANd SECuRITY
The questions in the paper may be reformulated as 
follows: First, are security regulations compatible 
with principles of collective agreements constitut-
ing the foundation of the Nordic model and explic-
itly expressed in the regulation regimes? Second, 
are security regulations compatible with the socio-
technical premises embedded in the risk regulating 
model?
By withdrawing the openness in the process of 
regulatory development there is no way to ensure 
that the different groups and agents affected by 
the regulation will have any influence. As the 
Eu appoints committees that consist of mixed 
 backgrounds and expertise, it may be asserted that 
the process of regulatory development at least 
appears as semi-democratic. By comparing it to 
the previous system, in this case the  Norwegian 
civil aviation system, where the demand for open-
ness and involvement were met at a national 
level, the current system may be labeled as some-
what  elitist. The rapidity trait is closely knit to 
the secrecy trait because rapidity excludes wide 
involvement and excludes many from the informa-
tion loop. In  Norway, pre 9/11, there was a time 
span of 3 months before any changes were made 
in the Civil Aviation Act. This opened up for a 
wider involvement of stakeholders and propos-
als were arranged as hearings and sent round for 
comments. This would ensure that as many of the 
affected parties as possible had the opportunity 
to influence. As Norway in practice is obliged to 
follow Eu regulation through the EEA agree-
ment, the traditional approach to implementa-
tion of regulation has in effect disappeared. data 
from the Ministry of Transportation report that 
the expiry date on arriving regulations complicate 
wide involvement, but as the regulation is already 
set in the Eu, there is in practice few possibilities 
for changing it. The reactivity trait also has some 
apparent challenges because it bases regulation on 
previous incidents. The obvious limitation is that 
in the case of something unexpected, the current 
system may not be able to catch a possible attack if  
it deviates too much in its appearance from previ-
ous attacks.
Renn (2008) proposes fundamental principles 
for governing risk and of  “good governance”. The 
Risk Governance Framework has an ambition of 
being an “integrated analytic framework for risk 
governance which provides guidance for the devel-
opment of comprehensive assessment and manage-
ment strategies to cope with risks, in particular at 
the global level” (Renn, 2008, p. 11). The frame-
work consists of  a combination of  positivistic and 
relativistic traditions and looks at how risk-related 
decision-making processes unfold when a range of 
actors are involved, as is the case in the  European 
aviation sector as well as the petroleum sector. 
Renn (2008) also states that it is important to 
include the historical and legal background, guid-
ing systems, value systems and perceptions when 
governing risk. The framework proposes a new 
categorisation of  risk based on different states 
of  knowledge of  the various risks in society. The 
categories are: simple, complex and ambiguous risk 
problems and are dependent on (a) if  it is possi-
ble to establish cause-effect relationship and (b) if  
there are differences in how the public are defining 
values and what kind of  reaction is appropriate to 
handle the different types of  risk.
Table 2. Safety vs. security in 
different regulatory settings.
Safety Security
• Goal based • Prescriptive
• Participatory • Elitist
• Bottom up • Top down
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The decision process involved in how to address 
a particular risk problem includes what and whom 
to involve and what to do and how to make selec-
tions. This risk governance model advocates the 
belief  of inclusive governance when dealing with 
global and systematic risks. Political, business, sci-
entific, and civil society players should contribute 
in the process of framing the problem, generating 
options, evaluating options and coming to a joint 
conclusion. diverse risk problems require different 
amounts of stakeholder involvement. The more 
complex and controversial, the more involvement 
is required to manage risks. Ordinary and tra-
ditional risk problems (simple) are usually best 
handled using an instrumental discourse among 
agency staff, directly affected groups and enforce-
ment personnel. On the other hand, when there is 
considerable uncertainty and disputes about val-
ues or consequences, it is convenient to arrange 
debates in a participative discourse.
The “risk governance model” is based on a con-
cept of “deliberative democracy” where transpar-
ency and openness are the basic requirements in an 
international society when confronted with complex 
and uncertain risk classes. International terrorism is 
a complex and highly uncertain phenomena, and in 
contrast with, for example, natural disasters, acci-
dents in high technological systems, and pandem-
ics, terror attacks are caused by intentional actions. 
Terrorists are people who employ all their energy 
trying to break security barriers and who in worst 
case manage to kill large amounts of people. This 
outlines the dilemma of security because a trans-
parent regulatory regime is also transparent for 
those who want to break it. Although this may be 
an obstacle to openness and transparency it does 
not exclude it. Accordingly, the character of secu-
rity as we have defined it is not compatible with the 
ideal principles of the risk governance framework.
In the risk governance framework it is essential 
to identify the risk problem or problems inherent 
in the socio-technical system in order to develop 
(eventually understand) regulatory measures and 
the degree of stakeholder involvement that should 
be implemented in the regulatory scheme.  Looking 
at the different characteristics of risk problems in 
Renn’s (2005)model, the framework suggests an 
instrumental process driven by the agencies/indus-
try responsible if  the risk problem is simple. On the 
opposite side of the scale, ambiguity-induced risk 
problems should be prepared and implemented 
by a wide involvement of both stakeholders and 
the general public, joining agency/industry man-
agement and experts/scientists in the discourse in 
order to survey the different cultures, values and 
opinions in the society where the regulation should 
be implemented. Handling risks in the “Nordic 
Model” may thus be characterised as “ambiguity 
induced”. Such an institutional setting will con-
front sloppy and ignorant attitudes at local levels 
and challenge the actors’ attitude towards respon-
sibility. However, this form of regulative practise, 
accounting for social and cultural values when 
designing and implementing new routines and pro-
cedures, require less responsibility aversion by the 
actors involved. Accordingly, rules and procedures 
with local involvement gain greater legitimacy 
among the participants but also demand a higher 
willingness to take responsibility for  security. 
Accordingly, the ideal principles of the safety 
regimes in the petroleum sector satisfy all basic 
principles of the Risk governance framework.
Another dimension is the level of governance. 
Following theory, one level of governance will 
influence on the possibility to govern in other lev-
els. Accordingly, we argue that risk governance 
enforced on one level (e.g. Eu) will exclude the 
possibility to govern risk on lower levels of a regu-
latory regime (e.g. national agencies). Thus, when 
a socio-technical systemis governed on a supra-
national level, applying an instrumental approach 
such as we have identified in Eu aviation security 
implementations, governance on this level will ‘lock’ 
the involvement from stakeholders, interest groups 
and the general public at national and local indus-
try levels. The democratic and local aspects of the 
model will thus be challenged and even violated.
3 CONCLuSION
The security challenges both facing the petroleum 
industry and the aviation sector have shown that 
traditional participatory ideal and socio-technical 
approaches are not appropriate with dealing with 
terrorist threat. As the risk problems of any socio-
technical system are ambiguity induced we are 
faced with a discrepancy between risk governance 
theory and regulatory practice. Ideally, following 
the Risk Governance Framework (Renn, 2005), 
knowledge and considerations concerning the 
social and political contexts should be an impor-
tant factor when governing security risks. However, 
it leads us to remind ourselves what contextual 
factors that explain why a top down instrumental 
regulatory regime has been developed. Actions 
taken after 9/11 have challenged democratic values 
worldwide where “war against terror” exclusively 
has been based on military premises. Following 
the definitions of safety and security there are 
arguments in favor of also dividing the organiza-
tional instruments. However, and as underlined by 
 Cambacedes & Chaudet (2010), there may be more 
to win by searching for how these two concepts 
may mutual benefit from each other than building 
up two incompatible regimes.
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